Despite struggling to capture my sentiments on the recent death of actor Robin Williams, a public discourse on happiness and its illusive pursuit is warranted.  Any proper discussion will no doubt lead to the ultimate question “what is happiness?” There is no better source than “Aristotle’s Ethics.” Written circa 350 B.C. in the tradition of Aristotle’s teacher Plato and of Plato’s teacher Socrates – it addresses the question What is the best life for man? “An extended reflection on virtue and happiness, the writing helped to inform the moral and political thought of America’s Founders” as noted in its brief introduction in Hillsdale College’s U.S. Constitution Reader. The challenging writing style has necessitated numerous readings – during which I highlighted key phrases and sentences that help distill the message. When taken as a whole they provide a decent sketch or outline of Aristotle’s thoughts on virtue and happiness (and what Washington termed their “indissoluble union”):

The good is that at which all things aim.

the works produced (the ends) are by nature better things than the activities.

If there is some end of the things we do that we want on account of itself . . . this would be the good, and in fact the highest good.

Then would not an awareness of it have great weight in one’s life, so that, like archers who have a target, we would be more apt to hit upon what is needed?

But if this is so, one ought to try to get a grasp, at least in outline, of what it is . . .

politics appears to be of this sort, . . ., so that this end would be the human good.

So our pursuit aims at this, and is in a certain way political.

The things that are beautiful and just, about which politics investigates, involve great disagreement and inconsistency, so that they are thought to belong only to convention and not to nature. And the things that are good also involve some inconsistency of this sort . . . So one ought to be content, when speaking about such things and reasoning from such things, to point out the truth roughly and in outline . . .

All people are good at making distinctions about the things they are acquainted with, and each is a good judge of those things. Therefore, good judgment goes along with the way each one is educated . . .For this reason, it is not appropriate for a young person to be a student of politics, since the young are inexperienced in the actions of life, while these are the things about which politics speaks and from which it reasons.

            . . . for the deficiency doesn’t come from the time, but from living in accord with feeling and following every impulse. For knowledge comes to such people without profit, as it does to those who lack self-restraint; but to those who keep their desire in proportion and act in that way, knowing about these things would be of great benefit.

let us say what it is that we claim politics aims at, and what, of all the goods aimed at by action, is the highest.

. . . say it is happiness, and assume that living well and doing well are the same thing as being happy. But about happiness – what it is – they are in dispute, and most people do not give the same account of it as the wise.

Now to review all the opinions is perhaps rather pointless . . . let it not escape our notice that arguments from first principles differ from those that go up toward first principles. For Plato rightly raised this question, and used to inquire whether the road is from first principles or up to first principles . . .

One must begin from what is known, but this has two meanings, the things that are known to us and the things that are known simply. (self-evident)

For the primary thing is that something is so, and if this is sufficiently evident, there is no additional need for the reason why.

Most people . . . seem, not without reason, to assume from peoples’ lives that pleasure is the good and is happiness. For this reason they are content with a life devoted to enjoyment. For there are three ways of life especially that hold prominence: the one just now mentioned, and the political life, and third, the contemplative life. Now most people show themselves to be completely slavish by choosing a life that belongs to fatted cattle . . . But . . . active people choose honor, for this is pretty much the goal of political life. Now this appears to be too superficial for what is sought, for it seems to be in the ones who give honor rather than the one who is honored, but we divine that the good is something of one’s own and hard to take away. Also, people seem to pursue honor in order to be convinced that they themselves are good. At any rate they seek to be honored by the wise and by those who know them, and for virtue; it is clear, . . . according to these people, virtue is something greater, and . . . assume that this, rather than honor, is the end of the political life.

And the third way of life is the contemplative one, about which we shall make an investigation in what follows:

No doubt the better thing to do is to examine the universal good and go through the difficulties in the way it is spoken of, and yet such an inquiry becomes like trudging uphill because the men who introduced the forms were my friends. . . . (it is) necessary when keeping the truth safe is at stake, even to abandon the things that are one’s own . . . for while both [the truth and one’s friends] are loved, it is a sacred thing to give the higher honor to the truth.

But if the things mentioned are among things good on account of themselves, the meaning of the good in all of these would have to show itself as the same, just as the meaning of whiteness is the same in snow and in lead paint.

in every action and choice it is the end, since everyone does everything else for the sake of this. And so, if there is some end for all actions, this would be the good that belongs to action . . . but it is manifest that the highest good is something complete.

And we say that a thing that is pursued on account of itself is more complete than a thing pursued on account of something else, . . . the complete is what is chosen always for itself and never on account of anything else. And happiness seems to be of this sort most of all . . .

we choose honor and pleasure and intelligence and every virtue indeed on account of themselves . . . but we choose them also for the sake of happiness

we suppose happiness to be the most choiceworthy of all things

So happiness seems to be something complete and self-sufficient, and is, therefore, the end of actions.

the highest good is happiness

it still begs to be said in a more clear and distinct way what happiness is.

Now this might come about more readily if one were to grasp the work of a human being.

the good (nature) and the doing it well (virtue) seem to be in the work (pursuit)

but something peculiarly human is being sought.

So what remains is some sort of life that puts into action that in us that has articulate speech; of this capacity, one aspect is what is able to be persuaded by reason

one must set it down as a life in a state of being-at-work, since this seems to be the more governing meaning.

And if the work of a human being is a being-at-work of the soul in accordance with reason

this is simply because in all cases the superiority in excellence is attached to the work

the work of a human being is a certain sort of life . . . (that) consists of a being-at-work of the soul and actions that go along with reason

the human good comes to be disclosed as a being-at-work of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.

            But also, this must be in a complete life, for one swallow does not make a Spring, . . . , and in the same way one day or a short time does not make a person blessed and happy.

So let the good have been sketched in outline in this way, for presumably one needs to rough it in first and then inscribe the details later.

time is a good discoverer of such things, or makes the work easier;

And one ought not to demand a reason in all things alike, either, but it is sufficient in some cases for it to be shown beautifully that something is so, in particular such things as concern first principles; that something is so comes first and is a first principle. And of first principles, some are beheld by way of examples, other by sense perception, others by becoming experienced in some habit, and others in other ways. So one must try to go after each of them by the means that belong to its nature, and be serious about distinguishing them rightly, since this has great weight in what follows. For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things that are inquired after become illuminated along with it.